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Scholar’s Privilege: A Normative Primer
Ryan M. Rodenberg* and Anastasios Kaburakis**
Professor Stanley Fish’s forthcoming book, Versions of Academic
Freedom: From Professionalism to Revolution, highlights the diverse topics
and nuanced analyses in any thoughtful discussion of academic freedom.
This commentary focuses on one such micro-issue under the umbrella of
academic freedom – “scholar’s privilege.” Specifically, we outline and
posit on the freedom of academics not to disseminate their unpublished
research, particularly when subject to a litigant’s subpoena.
The foundation for scholar’s privilege is set forth in Rule 45 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The various subsections of the rule
provide parameters on a variety of issues, including: (i) the duty to avoid
undue burden;2 (ii) how to object to a subpoena;3 and (iii) the process to
compel production or inspection.4 Rule 45(d)(3) is particularly important.
It permits the court to quash or modify research-seeking subpoenas on the
basis of time, travel, privilege, or general burdensomeness considerations.5
A quartet of noteworthy cases has illustrated how courts view a claim
of scholar’s privilege. The First Circuit found data collected by two
scholars to be privileged in Cusumano v. Microsoft.6 In Buchanan v.
American Motors, the Sixth Circuit quashed a subpoena as unreasonably
burdensome, explaining:
Compliance with the subpoena would require the expert who has no
direct connection with the litigation to spend many days testifying and
disclosing all of the raw data, including thousands of documents,
accumulated over the course of a long and detailed research study.
Like the District Court, we note that the expert is not being called
because of observations or knowledge concerning the facts of the
accident and injury in litigation or because no other expert witnesses
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FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1).
3
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Scholar’s Privilege: In re Cusumano, 40 Jurimetrics J. 517 (2000).
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are available.7
Dow Chemical v. Allen granted protection for unpublished data, notes,
and working papers.8 In contrast, in Wright v. Jeep, the judge compelled
the non-party academic to provide the requested research concluding that
the professor was a public figure, “yet wants to remain essentially
anonymous so far as the administration of justice is concerned.”9
The freedom to control the divulgence of one’s research is an
important one. Colleges and universities should memorialize their support
for scholar’s privilege in one of two ways. First, a general duty to provide
legal counsel and expenses for professors asserting the privilege in court
could be included in the applicable employment agreement with language
analogous to that of an indemnity provision. Second, in a context where
collective bargaining agreements govern, a clause recognizing scholar’s
privilege could be embedded therein with the union and/or management
promising to support a professor’s claim of scholar’s privilege when
asserted in a formal judicial proceeding after being served with a subpoena.
In his new book, Professor Fish opines that an academic’s “job can be
properly done only if it is undistorted by the interests of outside
constituencies.”10 We agree. A robust scholar’s privilege preserves a
professor’s discretion as to the timing of research dissemination while
simultaneously serving as a buffer against litigants seeking to (aggressively)
compel production of academic work not yet in the public domain.
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